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In Re Bilski: A Midpoint in the
Evolution of Business Method Patents?
By R. David Donoghue,* & Michael A. Grill**
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

As 2008 drew to a close, the patent community anxiously awaited a decision from
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) in In re Bilski.1 Many expected
the court’s opinion to have a profound impact on process patents,2 particularly those
relating to business methods or software.3 Bernard Bilski and his fellow applicant, Rand
Warsaw, sought to patent a method of hedging risk for those involved in trading
commodities and commodity options.4 The method was an example of the purest type of
business method in that it was not specifically tied to any computer or other device and
did not result in a tangible product.5
In recent years, similar business method patents have stirred heated debate.6 Some
experts and commentators argue that these patents stifle innovation primarily because a
patent’s exclusionary incentive is unnecessary for methods that bring efficiency to the
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1
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Bilski v. Doll, 77 U.S.L.W. 3656
(U.S. June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
2
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
3
See generally U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 08/833,892.
4
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949-50.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 987, 1007-11, 1081 (2003) (summarizing arguments against business method patents, especially
those pertaining to the internet and software, but concluding, after an empirical analysis, that no good
reason exists to single Internet business methods out for heightened scrutiny); Monplaisir Hamilton,
Reducing the Patent Incentive: Federal Circuit Revisits Patentable Subject Matter in Ex Parte Bilski, 90 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 678, 678 (2008).
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commercial realm.7 Yet others are equally convinced that such method patents are a
critical engine for commercial innovation in the United States.8
The debate has hardly waned in the several months since Bilski’s issuance, with
some commentators in both camps either trumpeting9 or excoriating10 the decision as the
death knell for business method and software patents. These commentators have likewise
claimed that Bilski’s “machine-or-transformation” test necessarily excludes business
methods and software from the scope of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, though
they vociferously disagree about whether the exclusion is a good result. Still others on
either side of the debate believe the decision changes little.11 The wrangling promises to
continue with the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in the case on June 1, 2009.12
But neither the majority nor the concurring opinions in Bilski require the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to close its doors to such patents, and to the
extent it has, the PTO reads Bilski too strictly. A careful reading reveals that Bilski, at
most, reaffirms that abstract ideas and algorithms are not patentable, and provides
guidance in distinguishing such ideas and algorithms from patentable processes. In doing
so, Bilski examined and distilled the various and sometimes conflicting standards applied
over the past thirty years by courts struggling to make the same distinction. Not
surprisingly, Bilski follows the more recent trend away from the relatively lenient patent
eligibility threshold set just over a decade ago in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.13 Bilski also left the door open to continued patenting of
methods and software tied to machines or transformations of “articles.”14 Additionally,
the Bilski court explicitly conveyed both its openness to further refinement of the
machine-or-transformation test and its recognition that some processes or methods may
fall outside the test’s scope, yet be patent-eligible nonetheless.15 Thus, Bilski more
accurately represents a midpoint in the debate over business method and software patents,
not an endpoint. This is likely to remain true even after the Supreme Court’s eventual
decision.
Part I of this article analyzes recent judicial treatment of process patent eligibility
standards leading up to the Bilski decision and explains why the Bilski outcome was not
surprising. Part II dissects Bilski, noting what the opinion calls for, and more
importantly, what it does not. Part III argues that the Bilski court did not shut the door to
all business method and software patents – even when one reads between the lines.
7

E.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1005 (Mayer J., dissenting); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Are Business Method
Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 274-77 (2000).
8
E.g., Hamilton, supra note 6.
9
See, e.g., Erick Schonfeld, Your Business Method Patent Has Just Been Invalidated, TECHCRUNCH,
Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/10/30/your-business-model-patent-has-just-beeninvalidated/ (concluding the decision “is a good thing too because business-method patents tend to be
overly broad and abused”).
10
See, e.g., Wayne P. Sobon & Erika H. Arner, In re Bilski: 19th Century Thinking for 21st Century
Challenges, 1 LANDSLIDE (No. 3) 17, 20 (2009). Sobon and Arner were involved in preparing an amicus
brief on behalf of Accenture in Bilski. Id. at 17. Arner was also involved in the certiorari petition granted
in Bilski v. Doll. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2009).
11
See, e.g., Ben Klemens, In Regards to In re Bilski (Oct. 31, 2008),
http://ben.klemens.org/blog/arch/00000009.htm.
12
Bilski v. Doll, 77 U.S.L.W. 3656 (U.S. June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
13
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 267.
14
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
15
Id. at 956.
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Rather, Bilski (1) fixes the machine-or-transformation test as the starting point for
examiners assessing process patent eligibility, (2) clearly indicates that some business
methods and software will meet this test, and (3) recognizes that future developments in
technology—broadly defined—may demand either augmentation of the machine-ortransformation test or a refinement of its application, thus allowing a route to
patentability for those inventions requiring the exclusivity incentive, but not neatly fitting
the court’s test.
II. THE TREND AWAY FROM STATE STREET: BILSKI IS NO WATERSHED
¶6

¶7

¶8

The decision in State Street is largely responsible for ushering in an age of business
method and software patents.16 In State Street, the CAFC reversed a finding by the lower
court that U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (the ‘056 patent) was invalid on § 101 grounds.17
The ‘056 patent covered a “hub and spoke” data processing system for managing the
pooled assets of multiple mutual funds.18 The system called for a partnership of multiple
mutual funds operating a computer system designed to calculate the daily gains or losses
of the pooled partnership fund, the “hub,” and to determine the pro rata gains or losses
attributable to each “spoke” mutual fund.19 Within each “spoke” fund, a final share price
could be calculated quickly and accurately for sale to the public.20
The State Street court began its analysis of the ‘056 patent with the oft-cited
guiding principle from the Supreme Court that “anything under the sun that is made by
man” is patentable.21 The CAFC went on to hold first that the process survived the
“mathematical algorithm” exclusion to patentability because it practically applied an
algorithm to produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”22 In applying this language,
the State Street court emphasized “useful” while downplaying “concrete and tangible,”
stating, “[f]rom a practical standpoint, this means that to be patentable an algorithm must
be applied in a ‘useful’ way.”23
Next, State Street unequivocally dispensed with the “judicially-created, so-called
‘business method’ exception to statutory subject matter.”24 The CAFC explained that at
16

Id. at 1007 (Mayer, J., dissenting); Allison & Tiller, supra note 6, at 1007; see Lilly He, Legal
Update: In Re Bilski En Banc Rehearing on Patentable Subject Matter: Farewell to Business Method
Patents?, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 253 (2008).
17
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
18
Id. at 1371-72.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1373 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). But as Judge Mayer
explained in his Bilski dissent, State Street was not alone in quoting this principle out of context. Bilski,
545 F.3d at 1000 (Mayer, J., dissenting). In its original context, the legislative history giving rise to this
principle read: “A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or manufacture, which may include anything
under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the
conditions of the title are fulfilled.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
22
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373. The quoted language is ultimately derived from Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). Diehr involved the use of an algorithm to produce tangible, if not “concrete,”
cured rubber tires. Id.
23
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375; see also David J. Kappos et al., A Technological Contribution
Requirement for Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court Precedent and Policy, 6 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 152, 153 (2008) (“In State Street Bank and other opinions, the Federal Circuit has equated
patentability to mere usefulness.”)
24
Id. at 1375.

318

Vol. 7:3]

¶9

¶10

¶11

¶12

¶13

R. David Donoghue et al.

least since 1952, business methods should have been subject to the same standard of
patent eligibility as any other process or method.25
The eradication of the business method exception combined with the seemingly
diluted and undefined “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test led to a dramatic spike
in process applications associated with business and software.26 According to the PTO, it
has been deluged since 1995 with an unprecedented number of applications “arguably
[not falling] within the traditional rubric of ‘inventions’ in the ‘useful arts.’”27 Such
inventions have included, for example, “methods for holding conversations.”28
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has never endorsed the holding of State
Street. Indeed, Justices Breyer, Stevens and Souter have openly questioned the
appropriateness of the “useful, concrete and tangible result test.”29
The CAFC’s own recent precedent is even more intriguing. In particular, In re
Comiskey30 and In re Nuijten,31 both decided on September 20, 2007, demonstrate the
CAFC's own retreat from State Street’s breadth and arguably foreshadowed the Bilski
result.
In the first of these decisions, the Comiskey court affirmed the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences’ (“BPAI”) rejection of a claim to a legal arbitration process.32
While the examiner and the BPAI had rejected Comiskey’s claims on § 103 obviousness
grounds, the CAFC essentially preempted that issue.33 Instead, the court rejected claims
1 and 32 (along with most of their dependent claims) as unpatentable subject matter
under § 101 and remanded the remaining twenty-nine claims to the PTO to determine
whether the mental processes in those claims escaped obviousness limitations via the
addition of a general purpose computer or other modern communication devices.34 One
may wonder, ironically, whether the Comiskey application’s effects on the legal
industry—specifically within the field of arbitration—somehow triggered the CAFC’s
realization of how far-reaching, and potentially stifling, certain business method patents
had become in the twelve years since State Street.
In deciding that the arbitration claims were ineligible, the court in Comiskey spent
significant time explaining that an abstract idea or mental process is only patent eligible
to the extent “it is embodied in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves another
class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.”35 In doing so, the court drew heavily from Diamond v. Diehr36 and In re
25

Id.
Brief for Appellee Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office at 4,In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2007-1130).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (“[State Street] does
say that a process is patentable if it produces a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result.’ 149 F.3d at 1373. But
this Court has never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances
where this Court has held the contrary.”)
30
499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
31
500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
32
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1365.
33
Id. at 1368.
34
Id. at 1368, 1381.
35
Id. at 1376.
36
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
26
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Schrader,37 both of which required that processes reliant upon abstract ideas involve
some kind of physical machine or transformation of subject matter.38 Not surprisingly,
Bilski would later look to these same cases in its explicit adoption of the “machine-ortransformation test.”39
¶14
Additionally, certain dicta in Comiskey may have offered as much insight into the
CAFC’s evolving views as the holding itself. After explaining that the mental processes
in the remanded claims were patentable subject matter when combined with the use of
machines, the Comiskey court cautioned that a “routine addition of modern electronics to
an otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of
obviousness.”40 Were this concept to find its way into a future holding, it would have a
significantly more profound effect on software patents than Bilski standing alone.41 For if
the Bilski machine-or-transformation test were combined with the Comiskey dicta,
software could be patentable subject matter only when linked with a machine, but the link
to a general-purpose computer is likely obvious.42 Such a framework would seemingly
require software, then, to either operate on a specialized machine, or work a
transformation of an “article,” or both, in order to be eligible.
¶15
The CAFC further demonstrated its willingness to reign in the scope of § 101 in
Nuijten. The Nuijten court held that transitory, digitally “watermarked” signals fell
outside the “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” categories.43 The
court analyzed the signals under each category, spending the bulk of its opinion
determining that the signals themselves did not constitute articles of manufacture.44 The
PTO had already granted Nuijten’s process claims for encoding such signals and his
machine claims for generating and storing them.45
¶16
But Nuijten sought to marshal State Street’s emphasis upon an invention’s utility in
order to patent the signals themselves.46 Nuijten argued that if the CAFC found the
signals to be practical and useful, then it could, and should, skip the analysis as to
whether the signals fell into any of § 101’s four limiting categories.47 The court was not
persuaded, explaining that State Street’s apparent focus on an invention’s usefulness in

37

22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming the PTO’s rejection of a “method for competitively bidding
on a plurality of related items, such as contiguous tracts of land or the like”).
38
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1376-77.
39
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
40
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1380.
41
Bitlaw.com, http://www.bitlaw.com/source/cases/patent/Comiskey.html, (last visited May 1, 2009).
Such a result is unlikely, however, because on January 13, 2009, the CAFC vacated and revised the
September 20, 2007 Comiskey opinion. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Comiskey II) (Fed. Cir. 2009). The
bulk of the September 2007 decision remained in place, and thus claims 1 and 32 remained ineligible
subject matter under § 101. But the CAFC withdrew that portion of its opinion, including the quoted
language above, holding that the remaining twenty-nine claims were patent-eligible, and remanding for a
determination on obviousness grounds. See id. Rather, Comiskey II remanded these claims to the PTO for
a § 101 determination of eligibility in the first instance. Id. at 969.
42
See Bitlaw.com, http://www.bitlaw.com/source/cases/patent/Comiskey.html (last visited May 1,
2009).
43
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
44
Id. at 1353.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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no way diluted the limitations on subject matter eligibility imposed by § 101.48 In order
for an “invention” to be eligible for patent protection, it must fall into one of the four
categories.49 Mere utility is insufficient to render protection. The Bilski court would
build on and clarify this concept in adopting the “machine-or-transformation” test,
despite not directly discussing Nuijten.50
¶17
After the autumn of 2007, those with an interest in process and software patents
were left with the apparent conflict between Comiskey and State Street while Nuijten
further indicated the CAFC’s desire to halt the continued expansion of State Street’s
utilitarian test. Comiskey actually applied the “machine-or-transformation” test, but did
not hold it to be the sole test for patentable subject matter. Comiskey thus left a muddied
standard. Therefore, Bilski’s outcome should have been no surprise; the scope of
patentability required clarification, and the CAFC had exhibited a trend towards checking
§ 101 eligibility standards. Ultimately, Bilski didn’t go as far as it could have—or as far
as some say it has. And in comparing Bilski to State Street, it is important to keep in
mind that unlike Bilski, State Street involved a machine. In that context “concrete and
tangible” still meant more than merely “useful,” even if only nominally.51
III. IN RE BILSKI: THE MIDPOINT?
A. Background
¶18

The CAFC’s primary goal in ordering en banc review of Bilski was to clarify the
standards for identifying patentable processes pursuant to § 101.52 More specifically, the
opinion ventured to establish the governing criteria in distinguishing unpatentable mental
processes, abstract ideas, and fundamental principles,53 from patent-eligible processes.54
The court’s vehicle for reexamining process eligibility was the Bilski application.
¶19
Bilski claimed a method for hedging risk in the field of commodities and
commodity options trading.55 The method calls for an intermediary, such as a commodity
broker, to sell a commodity to a consumer at a fixed price, thus insulating the consumer
from the risk of a dramatic price increase. The broker must also purchase the commodity
48

Id.
Id.
50
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
51
See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (holding that the claim at issue was indeed a machine claim, though it was of “little relevance” to the
court whether the claim was directed to a machine or a process, so long as it was directed to one of the four
§ 101 categories).
52
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949.
53
See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). These cases establish
the principle, that “[p]henomena of nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
54
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952.
55
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949-50 (“A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold
by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: (a) initiating a series of transactions
between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of
said consumer; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to
said consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market
participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk
position of said series of consumer transactions”).
49
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at a fixed price, insulating the commodity producer from the risk of a price drop. By
effecting two such transactions, the broker—or “commodity provider”—hedges his risk.56
The same general method could be applied to purchase and sell options contracts for the
particular commodity, rather than the commodity itself.57 As the CAFC succinctly
explained, a middleman providing coal to power plants might sell coal to the plants at a
fixed price, while purchasing his requirements from a mining company at another fixed
price (preferably lower than the sales price).58 In doing so, the broker limits his potential
upside, but also hedges against any losses.59
¶20
The patent examiner rejected Bilski’s application on § 101 grounds, primarily
because the claims “manipulate[d] an abstract idea and solve[d] a purely mathematical
problem without limitation to a practical application.”60 Since the invention was not
limited to a practical application, the examiner also determined that it was not “directed
to the technological arts.”61 The BPAI ultimately affirmed the examiner’s decision on
appeal, but in doing so held that no case law supported a “technological arts” test.62 To
the extent the examiner relied on such a test, that reliance was misplaced.63 The BPAI
also held that the lack of a specific apparatus was not itself fatal to effecting a practical
application because a transformation of physical subject matter, absent any apparatus,
would still satisfy § 101.64 But, even under the transformation analysis, Bilski’s claim
failed, as the BPAI held that a “transformation” of non-physical financial and legal risks
and liabilities is not patent-eligible subject matter.65 Asking whether the claims
forestalled “any and every possible way of performing the steps” of the process, the
BPAI went on to measure Bilski’s claims on the basis of preemption.66 It held that the
claims indeed preempted all applications of the concept.67 Lastly, the BPAI determined
that Bilski’s claims could not pass State Street’s “useful, concrete, and tangible result”
test because a “concrete and tangible result is interpreted to be the opposite of an abstract
idea and requires some sort of physical instantiation.”68
¶21
Yet even with the above tests and indicators at its disposal, the BPAI still strained
“to define the line between a patentable practical application . . . and an unpatentable
abstract idea,”69 and it explicitly asked the CAFC to address the question directly.70
¶22
Bilski timely appealed the rejection. While the BPAI, as well as advocates and
critics of method and software patents, may have hoped for the CAFC to issue the final
word on process eligibility, the Bilski application was an imperfect vessel for such a
result. As with all cases, the Bilski court faced a limited set of questions framed by a
56

Id.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 950.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055 at *14 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
68
Id. at *15.
69
Id. at *21.
70
Id.
57
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limited set of facts.71 Even the most tantalizing, closely-related questions must be left
unanswered when not presented to the court.72 Clearly, one of the tantalizing questions in
Bilski was whether “software instructions implemented on a general purpose computer
are deemed ‘tied’ to a ‘particular machine.’”73 However, Bilski’s method did not
incorporate software. As Judge Michel has noted, the courts cannot deal in hypotheticals;
additional questions must properly arise before the court can offer additional answers.74
B. The Machine-or-Transformation Test
¶23

Against this backdrop, the CAFC did little more than streamline and clarify the
BPAI’s decision. The BPAI held that methods not tied to a specific machine can
nonetheless satisfy § 101 if a transformation of “physical” subject matter takes place, and
that the Bilski claim worked no such transformation.75 The CAFC would ratchet down
the BPAI’s threshold for physicality, holding that Bilski’s method transformed no articles
representative of a physical object or thing.76 Despite criticism that the court’s
employment of the machine-or-transformation test was arbitrary,77 even a cursory review
of the BPAI’s opinion demonstrates that the CAFC had a significant case law on which to
build. Such criticism also ignores the fact that, as recently as 2007, the Comiskey court
applied the machine-or-transformation test in essentially the same manner as the Bilski
court. The Comiskey court, however, did not fix the machine-or-transformation test as
the sole test for distinguishing abstract ideas from patentable processes.
¶24
Bilski marshaled the guidance from the Supreme Court decisions of Diamond v.
Diehr,78 Parker v. Flook79 and Gottschalk v. Benson, 80 each of which addressed the issue
of distinguishing abstract, unpatentable ideas from patentable ones. As an initial matter,
Diehr, Flook, and Benson each support the proposition that abstract ideas, laws of nature,
and natural phenomena are excluded from patentability.81 What distinguishes Bilski from
these three cases is that while they support the machine-or-transformation test, like

71

See In re Bilski, 264 F. App’x 896 (Fed Cir. 2008) (order granting en banc review and listing
questions to be briefed and reviewed).
72
A Conversation with Chief Judge Paul Michel, Intellectual Property Colloquium (January 2009),
http://www.ipcolloquium.com/Programs/4.html; see Bilski, 545 F.3d at 951 n.2, 960 n.23 (declining to
discuss § 101 issues relating to In re Nuijten, and patent-eligible and –ineligible software claims,
respectively).
73
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 950 (Bilski involved
neither software nor implementation of a general purpose computer).
74
A Conversation with Chief Judge Paul Michel, supra note 73; see also In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359,
1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the potentially complex
issues of when computers are Bilski-acceptable machines do not arise in the Ferguson claims” either).
75
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949-50.
76
See id. at 960, 962-63. The CAFC also instructed that Comiskey did not require claims reciting
mental processes to contain significant physical steps; it explained that even transformations of data can
pass the “transformation” branch of the machine-or-transformation test so long as the data is representative
of tangible things. Id. at 960, 962-63.
77
See, e.g., Sobon & Arner, supra note 10, at 20 (“Never has so much in a case depended on the
meaning of the word ‘the.’”).
78
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
79
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
80
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
81
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952.
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Comiskey, none explicitly establish it as the test.82 However, they come closer than some
critics acknowledge. For example, beginning with Benson in 1972, the court stated that
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.” 83 The Flook
court was more direct, observing that “[a]n argument can be made that the Supreme
Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either was
tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a ‘different state or
thing.’”84 Finally, in 1981, in evaluating the use of the Arrhenius equation in a
mechanized process for curing rubber tires, the Diehr court held that “transforming or
reducing an article to a different state or thing” was patentable.85 By claiming a method
tied to a specific apparatus or by claiming the transformation of new rubber to molded
rubber the process, even though relying on the algorithm, protected only a limited
identifiable set of processes. It does not preempt any other uses of the principle.86
¶25
Bilski’s “machine-or-transformation” test combines the above precedent, allowing a
claimant to meet the § 101 threshold by demonstrating either that the claim is tied to a
“particular machine” or that it transforms an “article.”87 Corollaries apply to both prongs.
First, the specific machine or transformation must “impose meaningful limits” on the
claimed process; in other words, the claim cannot preempt all uses of the underlying
principle.88 Moreover, the claim should not preempt all uses of a principle even within a
specific field.89 Preemption to either degree indicates a claim is not linked to any
particular application.90 Second, the link to a particular machine or transformation of an
article must not consist of “mere insignificant postsolution activity.”91 An example of
such activity might be the use of a computer to simply record or gather data somewhere
in the process.92
¶26
Because Bilski acknowledged that his claim was not linked to, and thus not limited
by, a particular machine, the court chose not to examine the scope of the “machine”
prong.93 The Court recognized that in doing so, it was leaving unanswered the major
question of “whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a
particular machine.”94 In their respective dissents, Judges Newman and Rader chastised
the majority for leaving open this and other difficult questions.
¶27
But the Bilski court was in a position to provide guidance only on the
“transformation” prong. Specifically, the court focused on what constitutes an “article.”95
82

See generally Diehr, 450 U.S. 175; Flook, 437 U.S. 584; Benson, 409 U.S. 63.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
84
Flook, 437 U.S. at 589; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
85
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 (the Diehr court also quoted the Benson language that “transformation . . . is
the clue to the patentability of a process . . . .”); Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (the process in Diehr satisfied both
prongs of the machine-or-transformation test as it was tied to a machine and transformed rubber).
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Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
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Id. at 961.
88
Id. at 957, 961.
89
Id. at 957.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957 n.14.
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Id. at 962; A Conversation with Chief Judge Paul Michel, supra note 72.
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Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
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Id.
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On one end of the spectrum, actual physical objects and substances qualify as articles.96
On the other, legal obligations, organizational relationships and business risks do not.97
In between there exists, inter alia, electronic signals and data, some of which are
representative of physical and non-physical concepts,98 some of which are not.99 Bilski
held that eligible transformations must incorporate physical objects or substances or be
representative of the same.100 The Court pointed to the result in In re Abele101 to partly
illustrate its reasoning. In Abele, a process claim for graphically displaying variances in
unspecified data was held unpatentable, while a second process claim for visually
reproducing X-ray data representative of physical bones and organs was patentable.102
So, whereas a transformation of medical data into a visual depiction of physical human
tissues is patentable, transformations of social obligations or risks, and data
representative of such risks, are not.103
C. Cleaning House
¶28

In settling upon the “machine-or-transformation” test, the Bilski court sought to
streamline the process for eliminating abstract ideas.104 In part, it did so by eliminating
the other “purported articulations of § 101 tests.”105 The BPAI had applied three tests: a
version of the “machine-or-transformation” test, a preemption test, and the “useful,
concrete, and tangible result” test.106 The court thus began by almost summarily
abrogating the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, named after the three cases credited for
devising and distilling the test.107 The test asked two questions: 1) whether the claim
asserts an algorithm, and 2) if so, whether the algorithm applied to physical elements or
process steps.108 Noting that a process claim need not contain physical process steps, the
court declared this test inadequate.109 The court spent slightly more time dispensing with
State Street’s “useful, concrete and tangible result” test.110 The court briefly recognized
the test’s origins in the Supreme Court instruction that abstract ideas must be reduced to a
“practical application” in order to be patentable.111 It also admitted that the test will often
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Id.
Id. at 962-64.
98
Id. at 962-63 (describing the data transformation at issue in In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908-09
(C.C.P.A. 1982), as being representative of physical objects).
99
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
100
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
101
In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908-909 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
102
Id.; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963-64.
103
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963-64.
104
Id. at 949.
105
Id. at 959.
106
See generally Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006); Bilski,
545 F.3d at 950. The CAFC likely felt little obligation to spend much time abrogating this test, as State
Street had implicitly recognized the test’s inapplicability after Diamond v. Diehr and Diamond v.
Chakrabarty. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
107
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 959-60.
111
Id. at 959 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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provide useful indicators for determining patentability for borderline claims.112 But in the
end, the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test was dismissed as insufficient as well.113
Finally, the Bilski court made clear that, despite the examiner’s apparent application of a
“technological arts” test, no such test had ever existed, nor would one be adopted in
Bilski.114 The reason being that “technology” is a term too “ambiguous and everchanging” to underpin a meaningful test.115 Thus, what remains is the “machine-ortransformation” test and its two corollaries.
D. Voicing the Debate: The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
¶29

The In re Bilski concurrence from Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Linn, is a laborious
etymological analysis as to whether the Bilski claim would have been eligible at the time
of the Patent Act of 1793. The judges fully joined the majority opinion, but wrote
separately to counter the charges in Judges Newman’s and Rader’s dissents that the
majority usurped the legislature’s role by straying from the statute.116 The concurring
opinion’s most convincing argument, however, is drawn from yet another dissent, that of
Judge Mayer, who explained that the reference to “anything under the sun” being
patentable is quite misunderstood.117 In fact, the famous quote from the 1952 House
Report reads in full as follows: “A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun made by man, but it is not
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.”118
Judges Dyk and Mayer made two important observations about this quote. First, the
quote only refers to “machines and manufactures,” and thus offers no support that the
1952 Act intended to broaden “process” eligibility.119 Second, even with respect to
machines and manufactures, anything under the sun will not be patentable under § 101
unless it satisfies the requirements of Title 35.120 Thus, the use of this partial language to
continually broaden patentability for all categories in § 101 is ungrounded.
¶30
Judge Newman’s dissent was no more a surprise than the Majority opinion. In fact,
she utilized a similar formula for her dissent in Schrader.121 In both dissents, Judge
Newman cites the assertion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty122 that “anything under the sun
that is made by man” is patentable subject matter.123 She determined that the majority’s
construction of a “process” in both cases was too narrow, and that both Schrader’s
auction method124 and Bilski’s hedging method should fall within the definition.125 She
also put forth a history of “process” patents contra the concurrence, potentially getting the
112

Id.
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60.
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Id. at 950, 960.
115
Id. at 960.
116
Id. at 967 (Dyk, J., concurring).
117
Id. at 976 (Dyk, J., concurring); id. at 1000 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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H.R. REP. 82-1923, at 7 (1952).
119
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1000.
120
Id. at 976 (Dyk, J., concurring); id. at 1000 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
123
Schrader 22 F.3d at 297; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 980 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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Schrader 22 F.3d at 296-97.
125
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 997 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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better of that argument by, inter alia, noting the existence of a 1778 process patent over a
“plan for assurances on the lives of persons 10 to 80 years of age.”126 Ultimately, Judge
Newman's 20-plus page dissent is a tenacious defense of the position that patents drive
innovation and economic growth in unforeseeable ways, and any limits imposed by § 101
risk a chilling effect.127
¶31
Judge Rader’s dissent was guided largely by the same principle as Judge
Newman’s, stating that “as innovators seek the path to the next techno-revolution, this
court ties our patent system to dicta from an industrial age decades removed from the
bleeding edge.”128 Rader reached his conclusion rather abruptly, stating that the majority
should have affirmed the BPAI in a “single sentence” stating simply that the claim was
an abstract idea.129 But Rader ignored the question the Majority was charged with
answering–and the exact question on which the BPAI sought guidance: why is the claim
in Bilski an abstract idea and not a process?130 He made no effort to distinguish the two,
labeling the hedging method classically abstract, vague, fundamental, and obvious131—
terms that, without more, provide little guidance to a patent community on the bleeding
edge. Rader’s enumeration of unanswered questions in the wake of the machine-ortransformation test is well founded.132 Bilski does not, for example, define the scope of
insignificant post-solution activity, the application of specific machines, or the degree of
transformation required in any given process.133 But, as the BPAI rejection demonstrated,
each of these questions already existed, implicitly or otherwise, within the confines of
process eligibility.134
IV. WHAT GUIDEPOSTS HAS BILSKI ESTABLISHED?
¶32

Bilski leaves the door open to continued patenting of business methods and
software. At the least, Judge Mayer, in dissent, emphatically agrees.135 The question is:
how big is the door and how wide open? The Bilski court could not answer that question
on the facts presented, and given the ever advancing state of “technology,” there may
never be a conclusive answer.136 The court did supply the Patent Bar with two significant
guideposts: process claims tied either to 1) a machine or 2) a transformation will be
patent eligible, so long as both are accompanied by meaningful limits and do not
constitute insignificant post-solution activity.137 Only time and new cases can provide
additional indicators and contours of eligibility.138 But, at least some practitioners and
inventors have commented that Bilski may have made it easier to obtain software or
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Id. at 989 (Newman, J., dissenting).
See id. at 997-98 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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computer-related process patents, in that the decision has provided “a roadmap to
allowance for examiners,” who are “requiring only that a computer be included within the
claim.”139
¶33
If such a trend proves true, it would seem consistent with Bilski’s goals of
providing clarity without foreclosing unforeseen technologies from process eligibility.140
After all, Bilski acknowledged that the “machine-or-transformation” test may not easily
capture all patent-eligible inventions, recognizing, as Benson did, that some processes
may yet qualify despite failing this test.141 This acknowledgement, in conjunction with
the court's reaffirmation of State Street’s eradication of the “business method exception”
to patentability, 142 makes clear that Bilski did not seek to fully overturn State Street or to
return the law to the state in which it existed in Schrader. Whether a process “does
business” remains irrelevant to the § 101 analysis after Bilski. Thus, significant portions
of State Street remain alive, indicating that the gate to patent eligibility is wider than
some may believe.143 In fact, Bilski could be viewed on an epistemological level as
reasserting the “concrete” and “tangible” elements in the now indicative, but insufficient,
“useful, concrete, and tangible result” test. For if tied to a particular machine or
transformation, a process is almost assuredly concrete and tangible, despite whether it is
also a business method.144
¶34
Nor does Bilski seek to bar software patents; the opinion specifically explains that it
will be of little use in distinguishing eligible software claims.145 It bears repeating that
Bilski’s process was not tied to a particular machine.146 This fact allowed the CAFC to
limit its holding to avoid the trickier issue, hinted at in Comiskey,147 as to whether adding
a general-purpose computer to an abstract idea or mental process makes it patentable
pursuant to § 101. Moreover, Bilski left “technology” broadly defined and spurned a
“technological arts” test.148 This may have been done to address Judges Newman and
Rader’s view that new and evolving technologies may develop outside the scope of the
machine or transformation test, but may not necessarily be unintended under the
Constitution, the Patent Act, or prior precedent.149
¶35
Indeed, others fear as well that Bilski “pushes the United States patent system back
into a nineteenth-century mechanized, industrial past” in disregard of the “plain language
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Gene Quinn, US Supreme Court Grants Cert. in Bilski, IP WATCHDOG, June 1, 2009,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/06/01/us-supreme-court-grants-cert-in-bilski; Gene Quinn, Bilski Not So
Bad for Software Patents After All, IP WATCHDOG, May 19, 2009,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/05/19/bilski-not-so-bad-for-software-patents-after-all.
140
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
141
See id. at 956.
142
Id. at 960; In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 (rejecting calls for an exclusion of business methods, the court relied on State
Street’s elimination of such an exclusion, stating explicitly: “We reaffirm this conclusion.”).
144
Id. at 959.
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Id. at 960 n. 23 (“We also note that the process claim at issue in this appeal is not, in any event, a
software claim. Thus, the facts here would be largely unhelpful in illuminating the distinctions between
those software claims that are patent-eligible and those that are not.”).
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Id. at 962.
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See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussed in Section I, supra).
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Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960.
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Id. at 976, 1011 (Newman, J., dissenting, and Rader, J., dissenting, respectively).
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of the statute and . . . substantial Supreme Court precedent.”150 To the contrary, Benson,
Flook, and Diehr, in conjunction with Comiskey, and Nuijten (to some extent) indicate
that State Street and AT&T were truly the outlier cases to the extent they emphasized an
invention’s usefulness and downplayed tangibility. And, as Bilski points out, the
inventions at issue in both State Street and AT&T were tied to machines, namely
computers.151 Since the claimed method to hedge commodity risk was not tied to a
machine,152 the Bilski court remained careful to avoid examination of this issue. Thus,
Bilski does not present a sea change in which the outcomes of State Street or AT&T have
been overturned.
¶36
More subtly, Bilski may be drawing the eligibility line at inventions requiring the
exclusivity incentive afforded by patents. In doing so, it may not be the most
straightforward or enlightening opinion, but it gets closer to achieving the practical
necessities of the PTO and the Patent Bar than any of the dissents. The Majority, without
addressing this philosophical and policy debate directly, was seemingly conscious of the
role of incentives, and wisely refused to impose a blanket prohibition over either business
method or software applications.153 Judge Mayer’s dissent explored this policy analysis
overtly, determining that a blanket prohibition on business method applications is proper
because such methods require no patent incentive to drive development; thus, granting
such patents stifles innovation.154 Judges Newman and Rader view the “machine-ortransformation” test in itself to be stifling.155 The view expressed in their respective
dissents, which advocate that a useful invention should be evaluated under the remaining
requirements of the Patent Act, would practically dispense with any meaningful § 101
analysis, which is not what the Court intended in Benson, Flook and Diehr.
¶37
The en banc debate raises the issue of whether a rational business person would
invest in or implement a new process openly and notoriously without the exclusivity
incentive.156 If the answer is “yes,” then perhaps the method may be outside the scope of
eligibility for that reason. This is because granting a patent to such a method likely
imposes unnecessary costs upon the marketplace by preventing others from using a
process that will be disclosed to the public in any event.157
¶38
In this regard, the Bilski claim was a poor test case for advocates of business
method patents; the method seemingly makes sense to practice openly, with or without
patent protection, requiring none of the encouragement offered by the promise of
exclusivity or trade secret protection. It is doubtful that commodity brokers will now
150
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1, 2009 (“IBM maintains that the patents are not needed to promote innovation; businesses would come up
with the products even without patent protection. ‘You’re creating a new 20-year monopoly for no good
reason,’ IBM's top in-house patent attorney, David Kappos, told BusinessWeek last year.”), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2009/tc2009061_905686.htm.
151

329

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2009

exclude creative hedging methods from their arsenals. For-profit businesses, by
necessity, seek the most efficient, cost effective methods of operation and will
incorporate efficiencies absent patent incentives.158 Claimants acquiring patents over
such processes arguably receive windfalls.159 Such grants indicate a backsliding towards
the English Crown’s hated practice of bestowing industry-wide patents to “Court
favorites.”160 On the other hand, the promise of such exclusivity may spur a race to
develop more efficient methods sooner than they might otherwise be developed.161 The
CAFC’s analysis ultimately demonstrates its belief that a patent on Bilski’s claim—at
least in the form presented – would be antithetical to the constitutional goal of promoting
progress.162 But fact patterns are infinite, and Bilski also recognizes that instances will
arise in which the development and the disclosure of new, more effective processes,
including business methods and software, will rely upon the promise of a temporary
monopoly.163
V. CONCLUSION
¶39

Bilski does not draw a bright line for process patentability, to the chagrin of some,
and contrary to the belief of others,164 yet the exclusionary incentive seemingly remains
for processes that require it. Processes that implement machines, or work transformations
of articles or matter are likely to require serious investment in practice, and those that
pass the machine or transformation test will still be patent-eligible. Further, the CAFC
left the door open to refinement or alteration of the test as a whole, indicating that
inventions requiring the exclusivity incentive, yet not fitting neatly in the established
framework, may still be eligible. Bilski admittedly leaves major questions unanswered,
not the least of which is how the entire “machine” branch of the test should be applied.
¶40
It remains to be seen whether the machine-or-transformation test will itself prove a
sufficient tool for drawing consistent, and wise, distinctions at the heart of the process
patent eligibility debate. As State Street, Comiskey, and Bilski demonstrate, this
distinction is unfortunately an art, not a science. The law induces the development,
distribution, and disclosure of new ideas with monopolies, but it also protects undisclosed
ideas via trade secrets.165 Perhaps Bilski’s legacy will be an inching towards a distinction
158
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where process eligibility gives way at the point where a method is efficient to implement
with or without a monopoly, and where it cannot be hidden when used. In such
instances, efficiency incents development and implementation, while the inability to
conceal the process obviates the need to incent disclosure to the marketplace. This seems
a distinction consistent with the “machine-or-transformation” test, but Bilski is merely
one step towards that line.

331

